Respect, autonomy, and the moral origins of justice.
Moral judgment is a decision between unilateral respect for an authority and mutual respect for others. Social justice is an act of autonomy, but authoritarian justice implies heteronomy.
In today’s climate the word “social justice” sometimes incites negative reactions, and in some circles, it serves as comedic relief. A question emerges, if justice is a virtue, and social justice is unacceptable or worthy of ridicule, then exactly what type of justice should we strive for?
First, we can simply define social justice as a fair distribution of social privileges. Now, let us consider the alternative. On one hand, social justice requires mutual respect for others which is the foundation of a morality of cooperation, an act of autonomy. Authoritarian justice from unilateral respect for an authority, on the other hand, can only produce a morality of constraint, an act of heteronomy. Autonomy, mutual respect and cooperation, therefore, are all concepts central to the practice of justice based on social relations. In other words, respect for others, or a lack thereof, determines moral judgment — we have a choice between social justice and the cooperation of autonomy (a morality of cooperation) or authoritarian justice and the constraint of heteronomy (a morality of constraint).
These two types of morality, cooperation and constraint, were first detailed by Jean Piaget in “The Moral Judgement of the Child”. Piaget collected data to study the evolution of morality and concluded that the difference between unilateral and mutual respect shapes a persons’ idea of justice (Piaget, 1932; pp. 230). Young children develop their idea of justice by evolving their unilateral respect for a parent, the experience of heteronomy, into mutual respect and solidarity with their peers, the experience of autonomy. More succinctly, unilateral respect engenders heteronomy, a morality of constraint, and mutual respect produces autonomy, a morality of cooperation. In fact, Thomas Schelling developed his concept of reciprocal punishment by assuming mutual respect and autonomy to be the basis of cooperation; as described by Piaget (Schelling, 1966; Arms and Influence, pp. 149, footnote 11). Schelling’s exclusive adoption of a morality of cooperation makes social justice inherent to his game theoretic legacy.
As chosen by Schelling, reciprocal punishment comes from a morality of cooperation, whereas a morality of constraint produces expiatory punishment. Morally-constrained individuals believe punishment is arbitrary (expiatory) rather than a result of their actions (reciprocal). This exposes how unilateral respect for an authority precludes autonomy; thus, to be morally constrained is to accept heteronomy and serve authoritarian justice. Conversely, for adults following a morality of cooperation, justice is social, its rules shaped by cooperation and mutual respect. Rather than obeying the authors of a law, morally cooperative individuals follow a rule of justice that develops organically out of social relationships. To morally-cooperative individuals, justice is a law to govern their equilibrium — the law of reciprocity (as per game theory).
By choosing autonomy and reciprocity, Schelling was choosing Piaget’s morality of cooperation — an unsurprising choice given his compassion. Moral evolution means moving from a morality of constraint to a morality of cooperation; children evolve from the constraint of heteronomy and grow into the autonomy of cooperation. This evolution from heteronomy to autonomy, however, does not occur in all individuals, so some adults will behave according to a morality of constraint rather than a morality of cooperation. That is to say, the selective evolution of moral judgment in adults produces a mix of morality in a population; some will operate by constraint of an authority, others will cooperate.
Populations contain adults with different moralities, and children selectively evolve based on their development of respect, rendering mutual respect crucial for gaining autonomy. As children grow mutual respect for their peers they begin to question the morality of constraint imposed by an authority (including parents), and start to favor a morality of cooperation, choosing solidarity with others and reciprocal punishments over expiation (Piaget, 1932; pp. 196). Individuals that retain heteronomy instead of achieving autonomy have accepted the arbitrariness of expiatory punishment, making justice revenge of a disinterested type that emanates from an authority (Piaget, 1932; pp. 229). Instead of expiation as indifferent revenge, reciprocal punishment is about cooperative fairness — hence, Schelling’s choice for game theory.
With this framing of moral judgment, justice is either revenge on behalf of an authority or fairness for the sake of others. Comparing expiatory punishment to reciprocal punishment, therefore, reveals differences between social justice and authoritarian justice. The reciprocal punishment Schelling borrowed, for instance, tends to favor the equality of distributive justice because it is focused on cooperation not constraint. Expiatory punishment, conversely, is solely about retributive justice which is defined as due proportion between acts and punishments — equality is irrelevant to authoritarian justice. Demanding retribution in the form of expiatory punishment in due proportion, regardless of equality, is to become a tyrant. Thus, social justice, with its distributive justice that remains retributive, demands reciprocal punishment over expiation; equality is the opposite of tyranny. Choosing equality, as Schelling did, becomes an act of autonomy over heteronomy.
Social justice is a product of a morality of cooperation, the basis of game theory. Authoritarian justice is a product of a morality of constraint, an absence of mutual respect, autonomy and cooperation. The takeaway is that to better understand moral judgment, we must study justice (social and authoritarian) because it is the direct result of (or absence of) cooperation, making it “probably the most rational of all moral notions” (Piaget, 1932; pp. 195). Perhaps, taken together, Jean Piaget’s psychological research and Thomas Schelling’s game theoretic legacy are a starting point of inquiry for a modern reflection on moral judgment and justice (a collaboration between psychologists and economists would be apropos).
When it comes to morality, autonomy is achieved by choosing solidarity with others over obedience to an authority. And when respect is the foundation of moral judgment, the equality of social justice is a stark contrast to the lack of autonomy decreed by authoritarian justice.
